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1 Introduction
Many pay-as-you-go social security systems in the United States, Europe
and some parts of Asia face impending insolvency due to rising numbers of
pensioners per worker. Policy-makers are considering a number of potential
reforms, one being a transition away from a pay-as-you-go system to a fully
funded privatized retirements accounts system. Chile was at the forefront
of social security reform when it replaced its pay-as-you-go system with a
privatized accounts system in 1980.1 The Chilean system has since been
a prototype for pension reform in many other Latin American countries,
including Mexico, Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay.
Previous research on Chile finds substantial benefits from moving to a
private retirement accounts system in terms of developing well-functioning
capital markets and stimulating economic growth. However, there continues
to be a heated debate about other relative merits of a decentralized, private
accounts system vis-a`-vis a more centralized system. Critics of the privatized
system point to some problematic aspects, such as commissions and fees that
some consider to be excessive. The system has also come under criticism
because of low coverage rates and low rates of contributions among certain
segments of the population.
In Chile, as in many other Latin American countries, there is a dual
labor market with both covered and uncovered sector workers. In the covered
sector, individuals sign labor market contracts, pay taxes, and, under law,
are obliged to contribute 10% of their paycheck to the privatized pension
1The adoption of the private accounts system was in part influenced by University of
Chicago economists that were advisors to Augusto Pinochet’s during his military regime.
2
accounts system and an additional percentage for health insurance, disability
insurance and unemployment insurance. The uncovered sector consists of
wage workers with no formal labor contracts and self-employed workers who
are not required to contribute to the pension program under current Chilean
law. Rates of contributing to the privatized pension program are low among
uncovered sector workers.
The structure of the Chilean pension system can be described as a ”three-
pillar public/private system,” in the terminology of the World Bank (1994).
This paragraph draws on a description of the pension system given in Arenas
de Mesa et. al. (2006).The first pillar is the public safety-net component
that consists of a (i) means-tested welfare pension (pensiones asistenciales,
or PASIS) for the poor, (ii) a state guaranteed minimum pension (MPG)
for participants in the Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs, or
pension fund managers) who have at least 20 years of contributions, and
(iii) a public defined benefit system that administers the old PAYGO defined
benefit program (closed since 1980 to new entrants). The second pillar of
the pension system, which has received the most attention, consists of the
mandatory defined contribution program known as the AFP system. This is
a national savings program for all wage and salary workers that is intended
to provide participants with old-age benefits (it also provides a life insurance
and disability benefit as part of the mandatory program). 2 The third pillar
2When the new program was announced, existing workers were required to decide
whether to remain in the old INP system or to move to the new system. Those who
moved to the new system received credit for INP contributions known as a transferable
Recognition Bond (RB). The new AFP system is mandatory for all new wage and salary
workers joining the labor force as of 1981, but affiliation remains optional for self-employed
workers.
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of the Chilean pension system is a voluntary component, whereby affiliates
who wish to pay more than the mandated pension contribution may do so,
with their voluntary contributions receiving some tax benefits. Only a very
small fraction of workers make contributions over the obligatory level.
In March 2006, the Chilean president, Michele Bachelet, appointed an
independent commission of experts to study and propose improvements to
the pension system, with the goals of increasing coverage and contribution
rates. Two of the recommendations were to extend the state’s safety net
by reducing the required length of time needed to qualify for the minimum
pension benefit guarantee and by increasing the amount of income allowed
to qualify for the means-tested PASSIS program. A third recommendation
was to make contributions mandatory for self-employed workers. Some of
these proposed reforms were passed by Congress in January, 2008.
The aim of this paper is to study how individuals’ labor force and pension
contribution behavior is affected by the rules governing the system. We use
a dynamic model of labor force sector participation, retirement and contribu-
tion patterns to study these effects. The dynamic model takes into account
that individuals working in different labor market sectors face different wage
processes, that future wage and preference shocks are uncertain at the time of
making decisions, and that contributions rules differ for covered and uncov-
ered sector workers. The model is estimated using data from from the 2002
Historia Laboral y Seguridad Social (HLLS ) survey and the 2004 Enquesta
Proteccion Sociale (EPS ) follow up survey.3 The data contain demographic
3These data were gathered in 2002 and 2004 by the Microdata Center of the Department
of Economics of the Universidad de Chile under the direction of David Bravo. The data
collection was in part supported by an NIH grant, for which Petra Todd was the PI.
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and labor market information on 17,246 individuals age 15 or older, including
information on household characteristics, education, training and work his-
tory, pension plan participation, savings, as well as more limited information
on health, assets, disability status and utilization of medical services. This
study focuses on men, in part because many women do not work and to avoid
the consideration of the timing of fertility decisions and they interact with
working decisions. There are also extensive questions that are aimed at as-
sessing financial literacy and eliciting individual’s attitudes towards risk. We
complement the survey data with linked administrative data on pension con-
tributions and fees paid that we obtained from the pension fund regulatory
agency, market data on the performance of various pension funds (their re-
turns, costs and profits), and data on the fees/commissions of pension funds
that were in operation at different points in time. Through the linking of
the household demographic data to the administrative history of individual
pension fund decisions, we are able to carry out a detailed micro-economic
analysis of decision-making relevant to pension accumulations.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related litera-
ture. Section 3 provides more information on the Chilean pension system.
Section 4 describes the dataset and presents descriptive statistics for the
analysis sample. Section 5 presents the behavioral model and describes the
solution and estimation method. Section 6 presents the estimation results
and evidence on goodness of fit. Section 7 uses the estimated model to carry
out several policy experiments related to changes in the rules governing the
pension system and section 8 concludes.
5
2 Literature Review
This work builds on previous studies that develop and estimate dynamic
behavioral models for the purpose of studying how social security and pension
rules affect labor supply and retirement behavior, most notably Gustman
and Steinmeier (1986), Rust and Phelan (1997), French (2002), and Van
der Klaauw and Wolpin (2005). These studies use data from individuals
whose retirement benefits are defined benefit not defined contribution. Under
a defined benefit plan, the retirement benefits typically depend on age of
retirement, an average of the past earnings and years of service. In a defined
contribution scheme, such as that in Chile, the retirement benefits depend
on contribution accumulations and investment returns.
An early paper by Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) develops and estimates
a life-cycle model that they use to study how social security and pension
benefits affect working and retirement behavior. Individuals may be working
full-time, be partially retired or fully retired. The model includes the fact that
individuals in partial retirement obtain a lower wage rate than those working
full time. Once the model is estimated, it is used to simulate retirement
behavior. The simulations of the percentages of individuals who are working
full-time, partially retired, and fully retired are very similar to those observed
in the data, with peaks in retirement percentages at age 62 and 65. These
peaks occur because of effects that social security and pension benefits have
on wages and on retirement behavior. Their paper was the first empirical
study to treat each year as a separate period for obtaining optimal labor
supply paths over the entire life cycle. In our paper we also obtain these
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paths and examine how changes in retirement benefits affect labor decisions
of young individuals.
Rust and Phelan (1997) study how social security and Medicare affect re-
tirement behavior when some individuals face borrowing constraints and do
not have access to annuities and health insurance. They develop and estimate
a dynamic programming model about individuals’ decisions on labor supply
and application for social security benefits that incorporates constraints im-
posed by incomplete markets and allows for uncertainty in future earnings.
They find that the peak in retirement at 62 is best explained by the borrow-
ing constraints and that the peak at 65 is explained by incomplete markets
on annuities and health insurance and the fact that, for those older than 65,
Medicare is available after application for social security benefits.
Most recent empirical analysis of how social security regulations affects
retirement behavior incorporate savings behavior and heterogeneity, for in-
stance, French (2002) and Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2005). As opposed
to the earlier literature, these authors use the estimated model to conduct
various policy experiments to evaluate not only the effects on labor supply
and retirement behavior of older workers but also on that of workers younger
than 62 years old. Changes in the size of social security benefits and in
the legal age of retirement are some of the policy experiments they conduct.
French (2005) finds that the effects of those changes on working decisions of
younger individuals are smaller than those of old workers. Van der Klaauw
and Wolpin (2005), who model the decisions of married and single individ-
uals, find that, in general, the behavior of singles is more affected by those
changes than that of married individuals. Although we do not incorporate
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savings, outside of retirement savings in this paper, the model we use in this
study also includes heterogeneity. As in the above two papers, we are very
interested in evaluating the behavior of young individuals. The main differ-
ence between the models described above and the model used in this paper
is that we model not only the labor supply decision but also the choice of
informal and formal labor market and the contribution decision.
Most empirical studies of the Chilean pension system analyze aggregate
and macro data. For instance Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel (1995) use an
overlapping generations model with endogenous growth and formal-informal
production sectors to show how the privatization of the pension system ex-
plains the increasing private savings and rising growth. The authors suggest
that switching from a pay-as-you-go system to a fully funded system creates
incentives to move employment to the more efficient formal sector.
There are a few papers that use micro data, but mostly for descriptive
purposes. Areanas de Mesa et. al. (2004) examine coverage of the Chilean
pension system. They use the 2002 round of the Historia Laboral y Seguri-
dad Social (HLLS ) survey to estimate the density of contributions, which is
calculated by adding the number of months of contributions since January
1980 and dividing it by the total number of months since January, 1980.
That paper concludes that the average density 52% of months, which implies
substantially lower replacement rates for representative individuals upon re-
tirement than would a hypothetical contribution density of 80% as assumed
in previous studies that forecast old-age pensions. In a subsequent paper,
Arenas de Mesa et. al. (2006) use the same data linking information on
contributions to the administrative records provided by the pension fund
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regulatory agency, which are the same administrative data used in this pa-
per. They show that, over their lifetimes, men contribute more than women
and self-reported payments indicate higher contribution levels than those ob-
served in the contribution records. Also, they note that people usually do
not contribute during periods of unemployment or self-employment. They
also provide evidence that most workers know very little about the rules and
regulations of the pension system.
Motivated by the findings in Arenas de Mesa et al (2004, 2006), we are
interested in studying how pension investment decisions in Chile depend on
pension system rules. In particular, we evaluate the effect of changing the
rules of the system on employment in the covered sector and uncovered sector
and on contribution decisions.
3 The Chilean Pension System
The new Chilean Pension System known as the ”AFP system” is based on
individual capitalization. Each member of the system has an individual ac-
count where contributions are deposited. The accounts are managed by a
Pension Fund Administrator (AFP). The AFPs are competitive firms whose
purpose is to invest the pension funds in the capital market and to provide to
affiliates their corresponding retirement benefits since 2002, each AFP must
offer five funds with different levels of risk, and therefore, different returns.
Prior to 2002, only two different risk levels were offered. Members of the
system may change from one AFP to another whenever they want without
incurring any monetary switching cost.4
4There are currently six AFPs operating in Chile.
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For those members of the AFP system who are working, it is mandatory
to pay the following monthly contributions calculated as a percentage of the
their taxable wage and other taxable income with an upper limit of 60 UF
5: 1) 10% for the pension fund, 2) 7% for health services, 3) around 0.8%
to finance disability and survivorship insurance, and 4) around 1.6% for the
AFP expenses and profits. Besides the last two, which together are called
the percentage commission, there is a fixed commission charged every month.
The commissions are set by each Administrator.
Pensions are financed with the resources accumulated in the individual
account. If a member of the AFP system does not save enough to obtain a
pension equivalent to the minimum pension, the State finances the remain-
der provided the individual has accumulated 20 years of contribution by his
retirement age. The legal age of retirement is 65 for men and 60 for women.
Early retirement is allowed, provided that the retiree can obtain a pension
equal or greater than half his average earnings in the last 10 years and equal
or greater than 1.1 times the minimum pension guaranteed by the State.6
Membership of the AFP system is mandatory for those individuals in the
covered sector employed for the first time after January 1983 and voluntary
for the self-employed. Individuals that started working before January 1983
5The value of the UF as of December 2004 was $17,317 pesos (US$31)
6At retirement, a member can choose from three pension payout options: 1) pro-
grammed withdrawals, the member keeps his savings in his individual account and with-
draws annual amounts (in monthly payments). The AFP manages the account and recal-
culates the annual amount every year; 2) life annuity, the member purchases a life annuity
from a life insurance company where his savings are transferred. The Company promises
to make monthly payments until the death of the member; 3) temporary income with
deferred life annuity, the member keeps part of his savings in his individual account and
purchases a life annuity with the other part. He withdraws annual amounts until he starts
to receive the life annuity.
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and belonged to the old pay-as-you-go system have the right, but not the
obligation, to switch systems. Workers who switch to the individual cap-
italization system obtain their Recognition Bond, an instrument issued by
the State that represents the contributions paid to the pay-as-you-go system.
The bond becomes payable when the legal age of retirement is reached and
it is deposited in the worker’s individual account. The pensions and contri-
butions of those that stayed in the old system are managed by the Institute
of Social Security Normalization (INP) which was created in 1980.
4 The Data
We use data from from the 2002 Historia Laboral y Seguridad Social (HLLS )
survey and the 2004 Enquesta Proteccion Sociale (EPS ) follow up survey.
Both surveys constitute the longitudinal data set that contains information
at the individual level on a representative sample of the working-age popu-
lation in Chile. The data set covers around 17,000 respondents: 14,000 affil-
iated either with the pay-as-you-go system or the AFP system at any time
since 1981, and 3,000 not affiliated to any pension system. The respondents
were either working, unemployed, out of the labor force, or officially retired.
The data contain information on affiliation status, employment history since
1980, pension contributions, retirement plan participation, savings, educa-
tion, health, family background, family income, assets, and capital. The
2006 follow-up has been already administered and an additional follow-up
round is planned for 2008. Half of the respondents are men. The most
relevant information collected in the EPS survey for this study is the retro-
spective data on employment, non-employment, and unemployment spells,
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available back to 1980.
The EPS information can be linked to administrative records on manda-
tory and voluntary monthly contributions, monthly wages, changes between
AFPs and delayed payments. There are also data on the value of the Recog-
nition Bond for those who switched systems and information on the type of
pension plan that retirees receive. For the purposes of this study, the most
important administrative information is the histories of monthly contribu-
tions and wages for those that contribute since January 1981. The Surveys
linked to administrative records provide the essential data base for studying
the effect of the rules of the pension system on employment and contribution
decisions.
Because many women do not work in the paid labor market for long
periods of time, this study focuses on men. The parameters of the model are
estimated only the information on men between 18 and 39 years old in 2004
for the following reasons: 1) it is assumed that men can start contributing
at 18, the age at which they should finish high school; 2) membership of the
AFP system is mandatory for those entering the workforce for the first time
after January 1983. By restricting the analysis to younger individuals, we
ensure that these individuals never paid contributions into the old system,
for which no records are available.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
The sample used in the estimation of the model consists of 2,517 men between
18 and 39 years old in 2004 with an average age of 30.4 who, by 2004, already
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finished their studies.7 Regarding the region of residence, 37.8% of them live
in a metropolitan area. The distribution of the individuals by education is
the following: 12.4% of them did not complete the basic education (8 years),
32.6% have between 8 and 11 years of education, and 42.2% completed high
school (12 years of education). The other 12.8% studied at least one year
of college. On average, they have 10.7 years of education. With regard to
marital and health status in 2004, 66.6% are already married and 9.3% have
been diagnosed with a chronic disease, such as diabetes, hypertension, etc.
Table 1 summarizes the socio-demographic characteristics of the sample.
Table 1: Socio-demographic Characteristics
Percentage
Residence in metropolitan area in 2004 37.8%
Bad health in 2004 9.3%
Married in 2004 66.6%
Mean Std. Dev.
Age in 2004 30.4 5.6
Years of education in 2004 10.7 3.0
Table 2 presents statistics relevant to LFP and pension contribution. On
average, individuals have worked 72.6% of the time since completing their
education. From that percentage, 26.6% of the time was spent in a covered
sector job and the other 46.0% in the uncovered sector. The mean of annual
earnings in the covered sector (2.2 million pesos) is higher than that in the
uncovered sector (1.5 million pesos).
The density of contributions is defined as the percentage of quarters of
contribution of the total number of quarters elapsed since an individual fin-
7The education decision is not included in the model. Individuals enter the sample
once they finished studying
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ished his studies. The mean of the density of contributions at the beginning
of the year is only 30.3%. From that 30.3%, 26.5% corresponds to mandatory
contributions paid while working in the covered sector and the other 3.8%
comes from voluntary contributions while in the uncovered sector. Although
individuals work in average 46.0% of the time in an uncovered job, they only
rarely make voluntary pension contributions on that job.
Table 2: Labor and Contribution Statistics *
Labor sector participation Mean Std. Dev.
Working 72.6% 32.3%
Covered sector 26.6% 29.1%
Uncovered sector 46.0% 35.0%
Not working 27.4% 32.3%
Annual earnings in thousands of pesos**
Covered sector 2,225 1,723
Uncovered sector 1,534 1,243
Contribution to the pension
Density of contributions 30.3% 29.4%
Covered sector 26.6% 29.1%
Uncovered sector 3.8% 10.5%
* counting since they finished studying and until 2004
** 1,000 pesos = US$1.785, 2004 pesos
Tables 3 to 5 present average earnings, the average of accumulated quarters
of work and contributions, the average percentage of time working, and the
average density of contributions in both labor sectors by age groups. As
shown in Table 3, after-tax earnings in the covered sector are between 40%
and 50% greater than earnings in the uncovered sector for every age group.
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Table 3: Earnings in the Covered and Uncovered Sectors by Group
of Age *
Thousands of Pesos*
Covered Uncovered
Age Group Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
18-20 1,223 687 874 699
21-25 1,727 1,122 1,230 907
26-30 2,542 1,912 1,694 1,283
31-35 2,965 2,052 1,915 1,445
36-39 3,077 1,979 2,140 1,507
* counting since individuals finished studying and until 2004
** 1,000 pesos US$1.785, 2004 pesos
Table 4 shows that, although earnings are higher in the covered sector, the
proportion of time working in the uncovered sector is greater than that in the
covered sector at all ages. However, the difference between these proportions
decreases with age. The group of individuals between 36 and 39 years old
have accumulated more than 65 quarters of work in both sectors. Had they
contributed every quarter, they would only need only 15 more quarters of
contributions to be eligible for the minimum pension. However, this group
has accumulated only 31.3 quarters of contribution on average. The density
of contributions in the uncovered sector, where contributions are voluntary,
is very low for every age group (see Table 5). It increases slightly with age,
from 1.6% to 5.5%.
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Table 4: Accumulated Quarters of Work and Percentage of Time
Working in the Covered and Uncovered Sectors by Group of Age*
Means
Age Group Covered Uncovered
18-20 0.5 8.5% 2.4 40.3%
21-25 4.2 21.3% 8.7 45.3%
26-30 12.2 33.5% 17.6 47.2%
31-35 20.9 38.2% 27.7 48.7%
36-39 27.3 37.5% 38.6 52.2%
*Counting since individuals finished studying
Table 5: Accumulated Quarters of Contribution and Density of Con-
tribution in the Covered and Uncovered Sectors by Group of Age*
Means
Age Group Covered Uncovered
18-20 0.5 8.5% 0.1 1.6%
21-25 4.2 21.3% 0.6 3.3%
26-30 12.2 33.5% 1.7 4.4%
31-35 20.9 38.2% 2.9 5.1%
36-39 27.3 37.5% 4.0 5.5%
*Counting since individuals finished studying
5 The Model
The model we estimate and use for the counterfactual simulations builds on a
model developed in Velez-Grajales (2008). It represents an individual’s deci-
sion problem with regard to dynamic labor market participation and pensions
contributions. The model starts at the age the individual finishes his studies,
ao, and ends at age A¯ = 85. The individual makes decisions until retirement,
at age A. At the beginning of each period a ≤ A, he observes his health
status and marital status and receives wage offers from both labor market
sectors, the covered sector and the uncovered sector, and decides how many
16
quarters to work, how many quarters not to work, or to retire. We define
the covered sector as the one where workers have signed employment con-
tracts and pension contribution is compulsory. The uncovered sector includes
jobs where workers have not contributing the pensions program is voluntary.
signed a contract or self-employment jobs and The individual chooses how
many quarters to work. In the covered sector he has to contribute the same
number of quarters as he works. In the uncovered sector, the contribution
decision is also assumed to be made by quarter; so he has to decide how many
quarters to contribute from the quarters he works. Finally, it is assumed that
an individual does not contribute when not working.
Each period a ≤ A, the individual chooses one of the mutually exclusive
available combinations of labor and contribution decisions or retirement, k ∈
Ka, to maximizes his remaining expected present discounted lifetime utility:
V (Ωa, a) = max
k∈Ka
E
 A¯∑
τ=a
δτ−a(1−D(τ))τ−aUk(τ)|Ωa
 , (1)
where Ωa denotes the space at age a, δ is the discount factor and D is the
probability of dying next period.
The individual’s utility function, at each age a, is given by:
Ua = U(Ca, la, s
u
a;Ma, Ha, ε
C
a , ε
l
a, µ). (2)
The term Ca represents the individual’s consumption at age a. The individ-
ual obtains non-pecuniary utility from quarters not working and for quarters
working in the uncovered sector, la²{0, 1, 2, 3, 4} and sua²{0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, respec-
tively. Utility also depends on marital status and health status. The indi-
vidual has good health, Ha = 0, until diagnosed with a chronic disease, after
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which Ha = 1. Regarding marriage, he can be married, Ma = 1, or single,
Ma = 0. It is assumed that once an individual gets married he stays mar-
ried.* The probabilities of being diagnosed with a chronic disease or getting
married depend on age, years of education, previous health status, and unob-
served individual-specific factors. The terms εCa , ε
l
a are age-varying shocks to
the marginal utilities of consumption and leisure. The term µ is a vector of
unobserved individual-specific factors that affect preferences for consumption
and time working.
Consumption at age a < A is equal to earnings minus contributions if the
individual works, or an unemployment benefit. At ages a ≥ A it equals the
pension:
Ca =
{
sca
wca
4
[1− (τ + φ)] + wua
4
[sua − qua(τ + φ)] + CMI(la = 4), ∀a < A;
Pa, ∀a ≥ A,
(3)
where wca is the annual wage paid to the covered worker, w
u
a is the annual
wage paid to the uncovered worker, and b is the unemployment benefit the
worker receives when he does not work that year.8 The contribution rate is
10% of taxable earnings, τ = 0.1. The average fees and commissions that
AFPs charge per year are represented by φ.
Wage offers are sector-specific, wj, where j = c is covered and j = u is
uncovered. The wage offer for an individual at age a is:
wja = ρ
jKja(E,G, T
j
a , T
−j
a , ε
j
a;µ), (4)
where ρj is a sector-specific skill rental price, and Kja is the individual’s stock
8Incorporating savings other than the pension contributions greatly increases the com-
plexity of the estimation problem. Moreover, few people report other types of savings in
the data.
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of human capital at age a that varies with the job market sector. The individ-
ual accumulates capital through years of work experience. The cumulative
years worked in the sector j up to age a is represented by T ja (tenure). ε
j
a is
an age-varying shock that differs by sector and µ is a vector of unobserved
individual-specific factors that affect wage offers. Denote by Wa = [w
c
a, w
u
a ]
the vector that includes the wage offers received by an individual at the
beginning of period a.
The individual knows the following rules of the pension system:
1) Pensions are financed with the funds accumulated in the individual
investment accounts. Upon payout, it is assumed that the individual pur-
chases a life annuity and gets monthly payments until death at 85 years old.
The amount of the pension at each age a depends on the account balance
and an annuity factor that depends on age and marital status.
2) The account balance at the end of the period a is Ba = (Ba−1 + Γa) (1+
R), where Γa is the amount of contributions during period a, and R represents
the average annual rate of return of the pension fund which varies every year.9
3) When the funds in the account are insufficient to finance the minimum
pension set by the government, PM , the state guarantees the payment of
the minimum pension to members that fulfill the requirement of 20 years of
contribution (80 quarters).
4) The legal age of retirement for men is 65 years old, but retirees have
the option to take early retirement provided that the pension is higher than
half the average earnings in the last 10 years and higher than 1.1 times the
9The expected annual rate of return is E[R] = κ, then R = κ + εR, where εR is an
annual-varying shock.
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minimum pension.
5) Individuals who are not members of any pension system have the right
to get a basic pension, called PASIS 10, that is financed by the government.
To be eligible to get the PASIS the individual has to be at least 65 years old
and have an average wage lower than twice the minimum pension amount.11
The size of the PASIS is half of the minimum pension.
The initial conditions of the model are years of education, E²{0, 1, ..., 18},
and region of residence, G²{0, 1}, which takes the value of 1 if the individual
lives in the metropolitan area. The state variables at age a are the initial
conditions of the model plus age, year, previous marital status, previous
health status, years of work experience in each labor market sector, quarters
of contribution, balance in the individual account, average wage of last ten
years, and the vector of shocks ²a. We denote the state space at age a by Ωa,
Ωa =
{
a,E,G,Ma−1, Ha−1, T ca , T
u
a , Qa, Ba,W a, ²a
}
. (5)
The age-varying shocks to consumption, leisure, the wage offer in the
covered sector, the wage offer in the uncovered sector, and the rate of return
are assumed to be iid with mean zero, jointly normally distributed, and
serially uncorrelated.12 Additionally, the vector of unobserved individual-
specific factors is assumed to be independently distributed from the vector
of stochastic shocks.
10PASIS stands for Pension Asistencial (welfare pension)
11To be eligible for the PASIS individuals have to have an income less than 50% of the
minimum pension or no income at all. Here the eligibility depends on the level of the
average wage in the last ten years
12There are also implicit shocks to the probabilities of marriage and bad health, which
are assumed to be independently distributed from the explicit shocks considered.
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The functional forms for the utility, the wage offers, and the probabilities
of being in bad health and of getting married are described in Appendix A.
5.0.1 Model Solution
The model is solved by backwards recursion, starting from the last period
the individual makes decisions, A, to the initial period a0. It is assumed that
everyone retires by age 70. The terminal value is the discounted value of the
remaining lifetime utility, which depends on the pension and therefore on the
state space at age of retirement.13 At period A − 1, the individual chooses
the option that maximizes his period utility plus the terminal value given the
state space ΩA−1. Then at period A− 2, he calculates the alternative value
functions, integrating over the distribution of the shocks at period A− 1, for
every option and every point in the state space, that is, the expected value
next period A−1 given the decision k ∈ KA−2 and every state point in ΩA−2.
This is called the Emax function (Keane and Wolpin (1994, 1997)).
It is not possible to calculate the expected value for every point in the
state space given its size and because some of the state variables are con-
tinuous,and the model does not have a closed-form solution. We therefore
obtain a numerical solution using an approximation method to obtain the
value of the Emax function as proposed in Keane and Wolpin (1994, 1997).
The values computed at a subset of points of the state space are used to
approximate the Emax function by a polynomial in the state variables. To
calculate the expected value we use Monte Carlo integration. 14
13It is assumed that individuals discount their utility until they are 85 years old.
14The model is solved using 2,600 state space points and 40 draws for the shocks.
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5.0.2 Model Estimation
The parameters of the model are estimated using the Simulated Maximum
Likelihood method. The likelihood for a sample of I individuals is the prod-
uct of the I probabilities of the outcomes being observed each period up
to an age, given the initial conditions and the unobserved heterogeneity of
each individual. The observed outcomes include the following: a) the choice
k that is a combination of labor and contribution decisions, b) the health
status H that can be bad or good, c) the marital statusM that can be single
or married, d) the wage offers {wc, wu} received form each sector, and e) the
annual rate of return R. The vector of outcomes at period a is represented
by Oa = {ka, Ha,Ma, wca, wua , Ra}. The vector of initial conditions is the
state space at period a0 denoted by Ωa0 . Assume that the individual-specific
unobserved characteristics identifies 2 types of individuals in the popula-
tion, µ1 and µ2. Then, heterogeneity is represented by the vector of types
µ = {µ1, µ2}.
The likelihood for the sample of I individuals observed from their initial
period ai0 to period aˆ
i is
I∏
i=1
P
(
Oaˆi , Oaˆi−1, ..., Oai0|Ωai0 , µ
)
. (6)
Because the type is assumed to be known by the individual but unobserved
by the econometrician, it is integrated out. We also assume that the initial
conditions are exogenous conditional on type. The sample likelihood is:
I∏
i=1
2∑
t=1
{
P
(
Oaˆi , Oaˆi−1, ..., Oai0|Ωai0 , µt
)
× P
(
µt|Ωai0
)}
, (7)
where P
(
µt|Ωai0
)
is the probability of individual i of being of type t. These
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type probabilities are functions of the initial conditions and are also esti-
mated.
Due to the shocks’ serial independence assumption, the probability of observ-
ing the outcomes up to some age given the initial conditions and the type t
for an individual i can be written as:
P
(
Oaˆi|Ωaˆi , µt
)
P
(
Oaˆi−1|Ωaˆi−1, µt
)
...P
(
Oai0|Ωai0 , µt
)
. (8)
In the calculations of the probabilities it is necessary to integrate over the
shocks to to consumption, leisure, the wage offer in the covered sector, the
wage offer in the uncovered sector, and the rate of return. A difficulty that
has to be considered in calculating the likelihood is that some of the wages
are missing in the data. This problem is solved by integrating out over all
possible wages.
The maximization of the likelihood function iterates between the solution
of the model and the computation of the likelihood function. Because the
available options and choices in the model are discrete, we require the use
of a maximization algorithm that does not assume differentiability and we
use the simplex method. The identification of the parameters in the model
is obtained from the combination of exclusion restrictions and the functional
forms assumed.
6 Estimation Results and Model Fit
6.1 Parameter Estimates
The functional forms for the utility, the wage offers, the probabilities of
being in bad health and of getting married are presented in Appendix A. The
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estimates of the 51 estimated parameters are shown in Appendix B.15 Looking
at the estimates we observe some interesting aspects about the structure of
the model. Note in the first part of table 16 that θ2 > 0 which implies that
consumption and leisure are substitutes. As expected, the marginal utility of
consumption decreases with bad health (θ3 < 0) as opposed to the marginal
utility of leisure which increases with bad health (θ8 > 0). Single and young
individuals value leisure more than the married older ones (θ6, θ7 > 0), which
explains why young individuals work less as the simulations below show.
However, for those who work the utility of working in the uncovered sector
is higher than that of working in the covered sector (θ10 > 0).
There is a positive effect of work experience on wage offers in both labor
sectors; however, the effect is more important in the covered sector than in
the uncovered sector. Moreover, having worked in the covered sector has a
very small effect on wages offered in the uncovered sector. The estimates
about region of residence imply that living in the metropolitan area has a
higher positive effect on wage offers in the uncovered sector than on those in
the covered sector.
The probability of marriage increases with age and years of education,
although the positive relationship with age is stronger than that with years
of education. Regarding the probability of being in bad health, age has a
positive effect and education has a negative effect.
15The discount factor δ is not estimated because it is not possible to identify it alone.
We use a δ = 0.9
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6.2 Model Goodness of Fit and Base-Line Model Statis-
tics
This section presents the model’s goodness of fit to the data. As noted
earlier, the model is estimated using data on men at ages 18-39. The model
fits the data well in several dimensions as shown in, Tables 6 to 9. Table 6
presents the comparison of the average accumulated number of quarters of
work per sector by groups of age. The model predicts quarters of work very
well, although the predictions are slightly higher than those observed in the
data for the covered sector and slightly lower than those observed for the
uncovered sector. The predictions of accumulated quarters not working are
also higher than in the data. For age groups starting at 40 years old, only
simulated data are available.
Table 6: Accumulated Quarters of Work in the Covered and Uncov-
ered Sectors and Quarters not Working
Data/Simulated
Covered Uncovered No work
Age Group
(mean) (mean) (mean)
18-25 3.1/3.9 6.8/6.5 5.1/5.2
26-32 13.7/14.7 19.2/18.2 7.0/8.5
33-39 24.4/27.9 33.3/31.0 7.4/10.2
40-44 – /39.3 – /42.1 – /11.7
45-49 – /48.6 – /51.1 – /13.4
50-54 – /57.3 – /59.9 – /15.9
55-59 – /65.4 – /68.5 – /19.3
60-64 – /72.7 – /76.8 – /23.6
65-69 – /79.0 – /84.0 – /30.1
Table 7 shows how the model fits the data on accepted annual wages by
sector. The average predicted wages are close to actual wages for all age
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Table 7: Accepted Annual Wages in the Covered and Uncovered
Sectors
Data/Simulated
Covered Uncovered
Age Group
(mean) (mean)
18-25 1,640,718/1,648,139 1,124,914/1,340,707
26-32 2,675,647/2,378,733 1,724,703/1,917,354
33-39 3,039,368/3,230,492 1,993,377/2,251,030
40-44 – /3,775,020 – /2,529,600
45-49 – /3,992,639 – /2,728,268
50-54 – /4,056,046 – /2,883,663
55-59 – /3,981,479 – /3,010,349
60-64 – /3,843,688 – /3,101,069
65-69 – /4,305,409 – /2,663,775
groups used in the estimation.
Table 8 presents the fit to the accumulated quarters of contribution. The
model fits the patterns of quarters of contribution in the uncovered sector
fairly well. However, the simulated accumulations for older ages are constant
in that sector. For the covered sector, the model predicts slightly higher
accumulations than those observed in the data.
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Table 8: Accumulated Quarters of Contribution in the Covered and
Uncovered Sectors
Data/Simulated
Covered Uncovered
Age Group
(mean) (mean)
18-25 3.1/3.9 0.4/1.0
26-32 13.7/14.7 1.8/2.3
33-39 24.4/27.9 3.4/2.9
40-44 – /39.3 – /3.1
45-49 – /48.6 – /3.1
50-54 – /57.3 – /3.1
55-59 – /65.4 – /3.1
60-64 – /72.7 – /3.1
65-69 – /79.0 – /3.1
Table 9 shows the model’s fit of the proportion of married men and of
men in bad health. The model predicts very well the proportion married for
all the age groups. The predictions for the proportion of men in bad health
in the third group of age are slightly higher than that observed in the data,
although the difference is small. In the other groups the predicted probability
is the same as in the data.
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Table 9: Proportion of Married Men and Men in Bad Health
Data/Simulated
Married In bad health
Age Group
(mean) (mean)
18-25 0.28/0.28 0.02/0.02
26-32 0.70/0.70 0.05/0.05
33-39 0.85/0.83 0.08/0.09
40-44 –/0.84 –/0.17
45-49 –/0.84 –/0.26
50-54 –/0.84 –/0.40
55-59 –/0.84 –/0.58
60-64 –/0.84 –/0.76
65-69 –/0.84 –/0.90
7 Counterfactual Policy Experiments
7.1 Minimum Pension
The Minimum Pension Program is a welfare program sponsored by the gov-
ernment. It is provided to those members of the AFP system who are at
least 65 years old (60 for women) and do not save enough in their indi-
vidual accounts to obtain the current minimum pension amount set by the
government. The State guarantees to finance the difference between the
minimum pension and the pension obtained with the savings accumulated in
the individual account provided the individual has contributed for 20 years.
In January 2004, the minimum pension annual benefit was approximately
$860,000 pesos (approx. 1720 US Dollars).
To provide a larger fraction of the poor with a minimum pension in their
old-age, the Chilean government proposed eliminating the requirement of 20
years of contributions for the poor. Starting July 2008 the fixed minimum
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pension benefit was replaced with a graduated minimum pension benefit
called the Aporte Previsional Solidario de Vejez (APS). It is a complement
to the pension obtained with the resources accumulated in the individual
account that the State guarantees to finance. The size of the APS depends on
the size of the contributory pension that each member can get; the larger the
contributory pension the larger the APS. This complement will be provided
to those members of the AFP system who fulfill only two requirements: to
be at least 65 years old (60 for women) and to have a contributory pension
lower than the Pension Ma´xima con Aporte Solidario, which is a maximum
pension set by the government.
It is of policy interest to asses the impact of changing the rules regard-
ing the Minimum Pension benefit. We use the estimated model to evaluate
the impact on employment and contribution patterns of changes in the Min-
imum Pension rules similar to those already approved by the Congress at
the beginning of this year. Individual decisions on labor participation and
contribution to the pension are simulated under alternative scenarios. We
focus on the effects on the decisions of individuals in the age range of our
sample, for which the simulations would be expected to be most reliable.
7.1.1 Years of contributions required to get the Minimum Pension
Fiest we study the effect of changes in the quarters of contributions required
to be eligible to obtain the Minimum pension. Table 10 compares the simu-
lated accumulated quarters of work in both sectors for three different num-
bers of quarters required to be eligible to obtain the minimum pension: 80
(baseline), 60 and 40. The magnitude of the effects is greatest for younger
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people. For instance, the number of accumulated quarters of covered work
for those at ages 18-25 increases from 3.9 to 4.1 when the requirement goes
down to 60 quarters and from 3.9 to 4.3 when the requirement is 40 quarters.
On the other hand, the accumulated quarters of work in the covered sector
for those ages 60-64 increases only from 72.7 to 73.7 and from 72.7 to 75.2
respectively. Therefore, decreasing the number of quarters of contributions
required to get the minimum pension from 80 to 60, that is, by 25%, increases
work of the youngest group of individuals in the covered sector by 5% and
when that requirement is lowered from 80 to 40 quarters, that is 50% lower,
their work increases 10%. In the other groups of age there are also increases
in the accumulated quarters of work in the covered sector.
According to the simulations, the number of quarters of work in the un-
covered sector does not drop as much as it rises in the covered sector, which
implies that the observed response does not only come from individuals mov-
ing from the uncovered to the covered labor sector. In fact, most of the effect
is explained by a decrease in the number of quarters individuals stay at home.
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Table 10: Accumulated Quarters of Work in the Covered and Un-
covered Sectors and Quarters not Working
Req. Qr. 80 60 40
of Contr.
Baseline
Age Group Cov Unc NoW Cov Unc NoW Cov Unc NoW
18-25 3.9 6.5 5.2 4.1 6.5 5.0 4.3 6.5 4.8
26-32 14.7 18.2 8.5 15.2 18.0 8.2 15.8 17.8 7.9
33-39 27.9 31.0 10.2 28.7 30.6 9.8 29.6 30.1 9.4
40-44 39.3 42.1 11.7 40.2 41.5 11.3 41.4 40.8 10.9
45-49 48.6 51.1 13.4 49.6 50.4 13.1 50.9 49.6 12.6
50-54 57.3 59.9 15.9 58.4 59.2 15.5 59.8 58.3 15.0
55-59 65.4 68.5 19.3 66.4 67.8 18.9 67.9 66.9 18.3
60-64 72.7 76.8 23.6 73.7 76.2 23.2 75.2 75.3 22.6
65-69 79.0 84.0 30.1 79.6 82.9 30.6 80.4 81.6 31.1
Table 11 shows the effect of reducing the number of quarters required to
get the minimum pension on contributions from 80 to 60 or 40. Because it
is mandatory to contribute while working in the covered sector, the effect on
contributions in the covered sector is the same as the one described above for
work in that sector. The effect on contributions in the uncovered sector for
young people, the first three groups of age, is interesting. Even when work
in that sector decreases, the quarters of contributions increases. When the
requirement changes from 80 to 60 quarters, there is an increase of more than
30% and when it changes to 40 quarters, accumulated contributions increase
by more than 70%. Although the number of quarters of contributions in the
uncovered sector is small, a change in the number of quarters required to get
the minimum pension has important effects on the contribution decision.
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Table 11: Accumulated Quarters of Contributions in the Covered
and Uncovered Sectors and Quarters not Working
Required Quarters 80 60 40
of Contributions
Baseline
Age Group Cov Uncov Cov Uncov Cov Uncov
18-25 3.9 1.0 4.1 1.3 4.3 1.7
26-32 14.7 2.3 15.2 3.1 15.8 4.0
33-39 27.9 2.9 28.7 4.1 29.6 5.4
40-44 39.3 3.1 40.2 4.4 41.4 6.0
45-49 48.6 3.1 49.6 4.5 50.9 6.1
50-54 57.3 3.1 58.4 4.5 59.8 6.1
55-59 65.4 3.1 66.4 4.5 67.9 6.1
60-64 72.7 3.1 73.7 4.5 75.2 6.1
65-69 79.0 3.1 79.6 4.5 80.4 6.1
7.1.2 Size of the Minimum Pension
To measure the impact of changing the size of the Minimum Pension on
employment and contribution decisions, we first increase it by 25% from
$800, 000 pesos to $1, 000, 000 pesos and then by 50% to 1, 200, 000 pesos. In
these policy experiments, we still required 80 quarters of contributions to be
eligible to get the minimum pension.
Table 12 presents the effect of changing the size of the minimum pension
on the accumulated quarters of work. Work in the covered sector increases
when the size of the minimum pension is higher, especially for young men.
By ages 33-39, an individual has accumulated 2.8 more quarters of work in
the covered sector when the minimum pension is 25% higher and 7.9 more
quarters when the minimum pension is 50% higher. Work in the uncovered
sector decreases by a small amount.
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Table 12: Accumulated Quarters of Work in the Covered and Un-
covered Sectors and Quarters not Working
Size MPG $800,000 $1,000,000 $1,200,000
in pesos
Baseline
Age Group Cov Unc NoW Cov Unc NoW Cov Unc NoW
18-25 3.9 6.5 5.2 4.7 6.5 4.4 6.3 6.5 2.8
26-32 14.7 18.2 8.5 16.6 17.5 7.3 20.1 16.7 4.5
33-39 27.9 31.0 10.2 30.7 29.7 8.8 35.8 27.6 5.6
40-44 39.3 42.1 11.7 42.6 40.3 10.2 48.8 37.4 6.9
45-49 48.6 51.1 13.4 52.1 49.1 11.9 58.8 45.9 8.4
50-54 57.3 59.9 15.9 60.9 57.9 14.4 67.7 54.6 10.8
55-59 65.4 68.5 19.3 68.8 66.6 17.7 75.6 63.4 14.2
60-64 72.7 76.8 23.6 76.1 75.0 22.1 82.6 71.9 18.5
65-69 79.0 84.0 30.1 81.9 81.8 29.4 87.9 78.2 27.1
The accumulated quarters of contributions in the uncovered sector in-
crease steadily for young individuals as observed in Table 13. At ages 33-39
a worker accumulates 4.6 more quarters of contributions when the size of the
minimum pension increases 25% and accumulates 13.7 more quarters of con-
tributions when the minimum pension increased by 50%. In the last case, the
accumulation of contributions is almost 5 times higher than in the baseline.
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Table 13: Accumulated Quarters of Contributions in the Covered
and Uncovered Sectors
Size of the Minimum $800,000 $1,000,000 $1,200,000
Pension in pesos
Baseline
Age Group Cov Uncov Cov Uncov Cov Uncov
18-25 3.9 1.0 4.7 2.3 6.3 4.4
26-32 14.7 2.3 16.6 5.5 20.1 11.1
33-39 27.9 2.9 30.7 7.5 35.8 16.6
40-44 39.3 3.1 42.6 8.3 48.8 19.8
45-49 48.6 3.1 52.1 8.6 58.8 21.9
50-54 57.3 3.1 60.9 8.6 67.7 21.9
55-59 65.4 3.1 68.8 8.6 75.6 21.9
60-64 72.7 3.1 76.1 8.6 82.6 21.9
65-69 79.0 3.1 81.9 8.6 87.9 22.0
7.2 Commissions
In addition to the 10% of the taxable income that members pay as monthly
contributions, they have to pay for health insurance and commissions, where
the level of the commissions is set by each AFP. Currently the approximated
average percentage commission is 2.5% of taxable income. From that 2.5%,
0.85 percentage points are used to finance the disability and survivorship in-
surance, and the other 1.65 percentage points cover the AFPs’ administrative
costs and profits.
In the 1980s, the level of the percentage commission was around 3.5%.
It decreased subsequently until it reached around 2.5% in 2004. People in
Chile often complain about the high commissions charged by the AFPs. For
this reason, when the president Michelle Bachelet appointed a commission
of experts to study the possible reforms to the pension system, one of the
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points of discussion related to lowering the administrative fees. According
to the reforms to the pension system that the Congress approved at the
beginning of 2008, new AFP members would also automatically be assigned
to the AFP that charges the lowest fees, in an effort to increase the economic
competitiveness among AFPs.
To assess the impact of changing commissions on employment and con-
tributions, we simulate the effect of lowering the commission from 2.5% to
2.0% and then to 1.5%. As can be observed in Table 14 the effect on work
decisions of changes in commissions is very small. There is a positive effect
on work in the covered sector, but even decreasing fees by 1% increases the
accumulated quarters of covered work by less than one quarter. The effect
in the uncovered sector is negative but of the same magnitude as that in the
covered sector.
Table 14: Accumulated Quarters of Work in the Covered and Un-
covered Sectors and Quarters not Working
Commission 2.5% 2.0% 1.5%
Baseline
Age Group Cov Unc NoW Cov Unc NoW Cov Unc NoW
18-25 3.9 6.5 5.2 4.0 6.5 5.1 4.0 6.5 5.1
26-32 14.7 18.2 8.5 14.7 18.1 8.5 14.8 18.1 8.5
33-39 27.9 31.0 10.2 28.1 30.9 10.2 28.2 30.7 10.1
40-44 39.3 42.1 11.7 39.6 41.8 11.7 39.8 41.6 11.7
45-49 48.6 51.1 13.4 48.9 50.8 13.4 49.2 50.5 13.4
50-54 57.3 59.9 15.9 57.7 59.6 15.9 58.0 59.2 15.8
55-59 65.4 68.5 19.3 65.7 68.1 19.2 66.1 67.8 19.2
60-64 72.7 76.8 23.6 73.1 76.4 23.5 73.5 76.0 23.5
65-69 79.0 84.0 30.1 79.4 83.6 30.1 79.8 83.2 30.1
As Table 15 shows that lowering the percentage commission has a very
35
small positive effect on accumulated contributions. Although small, that
effect on contributions in the uncovered sector is higher for young individuals
when the commission is decreased from 2.5% to 1.5%.
Table 15: Accumulated Quarters of Contributions in the Covered
and Uncovered Sectors
Percentage Commission 2.5% 2.0% 1.5%
Baseline
Age Group Cov Uncov Cov Uncov Cov Uncov
18-25 3.9 1.0 4.0 1.1 4.0 1.7
26-32 14.7 2.3 14.7 2.5 14.8 2.6
33-39 27.9 2.9 28.1 3.1 28.2 3.4
40-44 39.3 3.1 39.6 3.3 39.8 3.6
45-49 48.6 3.1 48.9 3.4 49.2 3.7
50-54 57.3 3.1 57.7 3.4 58.0 3.7
55-59 65.4 3.1 65.7 3.4 66.1 3.7
60-64 72.7 3.1 73.1 3.4 73.5 3.7
65-69 79.0 3.1 79.4 3.4 79.8 3.7
8 Conclusions
Many pay-as-you-go pension systems are facing impending insolvency and
transitioning to a fully funded pension system is one policy option. The
Chilean Pension System has received much attention from researchers and
policy makers because Chile was the first country that switched from a pay-
as-you-go pension system to a private one based on individual capitalization.
In the new system, contributions are deposited in individual accounts that
are managed by the Pension Fund Managers (AFPs). The AFP system has
come under some criticism, because more than half of the workforce is not
currently contributing, especially the self-employed for whom contribution
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is voluntary and younger workers who tend to stay at home or work in the
uncovered sector. The AFP system adopted several recent reforms that are
designed to increase coverage rates and extend the state safety net.
We use a dynamic behavioral model of individual employment and contri-
bution decisions to measure how individuals change their work and contribu-
tion decisions in response to changes in pension system characteristics. This
model takes into account that contributions are mandatory in the covered
sector but voluntary in the uncovered sector. We conduct two kinds of policy
experiments regarding the Minimum Pension: 1) lower the number of quar-
ters of contributions required to obtain the minimum pension guaranteed by
the State and 2) increase the size of the minimum pension. These changes
are similar to those reforms already approved by the Chilean Congress in
January 2008.
For those individuals age 18-40, when the required number of quarters of
contributions is decreased by 25%, the accumulated number of quarters of
work in the covered sector increases between 3 and 5% and the accumulated
quarters of contributions increase between 30 and 40%. Moreover, when that
required number is decreased by 50%, covered work increases between 6 and
10% and accumulated contributions paid while in the uncovered sector in-
crease between 70 and 85%. The effect on contributions while in the covered
sector is the same as that on covered work because it is mandatory to con-
tribute there. Thus, decisions to work in the covered sector are sensitive to
the minimum requirements for a minimum pension.
With respect to changing the size of the minimum pension we find that
when the size of the minimum pension is increased by 25%, the accumulated
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quarters of work in the covered sector increases between 10 and 20% and the
accumulated quarters of contributions in the uncovered sector increases by
more than 100%. The impact of increasing the size of the minimum pension
by 50% is even higher. Accumulated quarters of work in the covered sector
increases between 30 and 60% and accumulated quarters of contribution in
the uncovered sector increase by around 4 times.
Two of the main goals of reforming the Chilean Individual Account Pen-
sion System were to increase contribution in the informal sector and to en-
courage labor market participation of young people. According to the re-
sults of the policy experiments, both reducing the quarters of contributions
required to get the minimum pension and increasing the size of the minimum
pension would be expected to have a significant positive effect both on work
in the covered sector and on contributions in the uncovered sector.
9 Bibliography
Arenas de Mesa, A., Jere Behrman, and David Bravo (2004), ”Characteris-
tics of and Determinants of the Density of Contributions in a Private Social
Security System”, MRRC, University of Michigan, working paper.
Arenas de Mesa, A., David Bravo, Jere R. Behrman, Olivia S. Mitchell, and
Petra E. Todd with assistance from Andre´s Otero, Jeremy Skog, Javiera
Va´squez, and Viviana Ve´lez Grajales (2006), ”The Chilean Pension Reform
Turns 25: Lessons from the Social Protection Survey”, University of Penn-
sylvania, mimeo.
38
Arenas de Mesa, and Carmelo Mesa-Lago (2006), ”The Structural Pension
Reform in Chile: Effects, Comparisons with other Latin American Reforms
and Lessons”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 22, No. 1.
Bellman, Richard (1957), ”Dynamic Programming”, Princeton Univ. Press,
Princeton, NJ.
Edwards, Alejandra and Estelle James (2006), ”Crowd-out, Adverse Selec-
tion and Information in Annuity Markets: Evidence from a New Retrospec-
tive Data Set in Chile”, MRRC, University of Michigan, working paper.
French Eric (2005), ”The Effects of Health, Wealth, and Wages on Labour
Supply and Retirement Behaviour”, Review of Economic Studies, 72, 395-
427.
Gustman, A. and Thomas Steinmeier (1986), ”A Structural Retirement Model”,
Econometrica, Vol. 54, No. 3, 555-584.
Jime´nez-Mart´ın Sergi, and Alfonso R. Sa´nchez Mart´ın (2007), ”An Evalua-
tion of the Life Cycle Effects of Minimum Pensions on Retirement Behavior”,
Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22: 923-950.
Lumsdaine, Robin L. and Olivia Mitchell (1999), ”New Developments in the
Economic Analysis of Retirement”, Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume
3, Edited by O. Ashenfelter and D. Card.
39
Keane, Michael and Kenneth Wolpin (1994), “The Solution and Estimation
of Discrete Choice Dynamic Programming Models by Simulation and Inter-
polation: Monte Carlo Evidence”, The Review of Economics and Statistics,
volume 76, no. 4, 648–672.
Keane, Michael and Kenneth Wolpin (1997), “The Career Decisions of Young
Men”, Journal of Political Economy, volume 105, no. 3, 473–522.
Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsio´n Social, Gobierno de Chile, ”Manual In-
formativo. S´ıntesis de los Conceptos Fundamentales”, April 2008.
Rust, J. and Christopher Phelan (1997), ”How Social Security and Medicare
Affect Retirement Behavior in a World of Incomplete Markets”, Economet-
rica, Vol. 65, No. 4, 781-831.
Stock, J. and David Wise (1990), ”Pensions, the Option Value of Work, and
Retirement”, Econometrica, Vol. 58, No. 5, 1151-1180.
Superintendency of Pension Fund Administrators, ”The Chilean Pension Sys-
tem”, Fourth Edition, Santiago-Chile, 2003.
Todd Petra E., and Kenneth I. Wolpin, ”Ex Ante Evaluation of Social Pro-
grams”, PIER Working Paper 06-022, University of Pennsylvania, May 2006.
Valde´s Salvador (2007), ”Pensio´n Solidaria: Ventajas, Defectos y Propues-
40
tas”, Instituto de Economı´a, Pontificia Universidad Cato´lica de Chile, Di-
reccio´n de Asuntos Pu´blicos.
Van der Klaauw, W. and Kenneth Wolpin (2005), ”Social Security and the
Retirement and Savings Behavior of Low Income Households”, University of
Pennsylvania, mimeo.
Velez-Grajales Viviana (2008), ”Reforms to an Individual Account Pension
System and their Effects on Work and Contribution Decisions: The Case of
Chile”, Working paper, University of Pennsylvania.
10 Appendix A: Functional Forms
Utility Function
Ua =
C
2∑
h=1
I(type=h)θh1
a
2∑
h=1
I(type=h)θh1
[
1 + exp
(
θ2la + θ3Ma + θ4ε
C
a
)]
+ θ5la + θ6la(25− a)I(a≤25)+
θ7la(1−Ma) + θ8laHa + θ9sua(1 + 0.15(25− a)I(a≤25)) + θ10εla
(9)
Wage Function in Covered Sector
ln(wca) =
2∑
h=1
I(type = h)γh1+γ2E+γ3G+γ4T
c
a+γ5(T
c
a)
2+γ6T
u
a+γ7(T
u
a )
2+γ8ε
c
a
(10)
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Wage Function in Uncovered Sector
ln(wua) =
2∑
h=1
I(type = h)ξh1+ξ2E+ξ3G+ξ4T
c
a+ξ5(T
c
a)
2+ξ6T
u
a +ξ7(T
u
a )
2+ξ8ε
u
a
(11)
Probability of Getting Married (Ma = 1)
piMa =
2∑
h=1
I(type = h)αh1 + α2a+ α3a
2 + α4E + α5E
2 (12)
Probability of Being in Bad Health (Ha = 1)
piHa =
2∑
h=1
I(type = h)βh1 + β2a+ β3a
2 + β4E + β5E
2 (13)
11 Appendix B: Estimates
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Table 16: Estimates: Part 1
Utility function Mean
θ11 =CRRA parameter type 1 0.5
θ21 =CRRA parameter type 2 0.5
θ2 =Consumption*leisure 0.2
θ3 =Consumption*bad health -0.08
θ4 =Shock to consumption 0.1
θ5 =Leisure 70.0
θ6 =Leisure for young 70.0
θ7 =Leisure*single 574.1
θ8 =Leisure*bad health 400.0
θ9 =Shock to leisure 0.1
θ10 =Non-pecuniary term for work in the uncovered sector 0.3
Wage Offer in the Covered Sector Mean
γ11 =Constant type 1 12.8
γ21 =Constant type 2 12.3
γ2 =Years of education 0.08
γ3 =Region of residence 0.07
γ4 =Years of work exp. in the covered sector 0.033
γ5 =Years of work exp. in the covered sector squared -0.00023
γ6 =Years of work exp. in the uncovered sector 0.0028
γ7 =Years of work exp. in the uncovered sector squared -0.000025
Wage Offer in the Uncovered Sector Mean
ξ11 =Constant type 1 11.7
ξ21 =Constant type 2 11.8
ξ2 =Years of education 0.08
ξ3 =Region of residence 0.1
ξ4 =Years of work exp. in the covered sector 0.0001
ξ5 =Years of work exp. in the covered sector squared -0.00001
ξ6 =Years of work exp. in the uncovered sector 0.024
ξ7 =Years of work exp. in the uncovered sector squared -0.00014
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Table 17: Estimates: Part 2
Probability of getting married Mean
α11 =Constant type 1 -15.2
α21 =Constant type 2 -15.3
α2 =Age 0.9
α3 =Age squared -0.018
α4 =Years of education 0.1
α5 =Years of education squared -0.007
Probability of being in bad health Mean
β11 =Constant type 1 -8.3
β21 =Constant type 2 -8.2
β2 =Age 0.1
β3 =Age squared 0.000001
β4 =Years of education -0.9
β5 =Years of education squared 0.006
Probability of being type 1 Mean
Constant -1.95
Age when finished studying 0.02
Years of education 0.11
Region 0.18
Married 0.01
Bad health 0.01
Returns Mean
Mean 0.11
Variance-Covariance matrix for the shocks Mean
Variance preference for consumption 1.1
Variance preference for leisure 1.1
Variance covered sector wage offer 0.7
Variance uncovered sector wage offer 1.5
Variance returns 0.005
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